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Summary. - This paper analyzes the problem of market disruption as it currently afflicts the 
exporting countries, chiefly LIES. Based on the analysis of optimal policy intervention under 
endogenous uncertainty, developed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (Journal of International 
Economics, November 19761, it develops a complere set of rules by which the developed and 
less developed countries may abide, under a revised GATT code, when faced by the problem of 
increased competitiveness of LDC exports to DC markets. These rules include the compensation 
of LDCs by DCs, in varying degrees, for both potential and actual exercise of import 
restrictions by DCs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses itself to the issue of 
‘market disruption’ and suggests schemes for 
compensating the less developed countries 
(LDCs) who face (what may aptly be described 
as) ‘export market disruption’ when the 
importing, developed countries (DCs) invoke 
protective devices, such as ‘voluntary’ export 
restraints, to assist domestic industries seeking 
relief from foreign competition. 
Section I deals with the problem of defining 
market disruption. Section II considers the 
GATT Article XIX on the subject and its 
relationship to national legislations. In light of 
this, Section III considers the principal forms in 
which market-disruption-related restrictions 
have been invoked, focusing then on ‘voluntary’ 
export restraints (VERs) and the more 
sustained and formal multilateral arrangements 
(i.e. the LTA which restricts the exports of 
textiles). Section IV then discusses the welfare- 
impact of the possibility of market-disruption- 
induced restrictions which LDCs face on their 
exports of manufactures. Section V then 
assesses the need for compensation that the 
welfare losses to LDCs imply from this analysis 
and, in light of this, develops specific proposals 
for such compensation. Section VI suggests 
ways in which the GATT Article XIX could be 
modified to implement these suggestions. 
Appendix I contains a brief review of one 
precedent, where the ‘importing’ country 
provided compensation to the ‘exporting’ 
country for ‘export market disruption’, so to 
speak. This is the case of the United States 
compensating Turkey for adjustment assistance 
to Turkish poppy farmers (the objective being 
to enable the farmers to shift to non-poppy 
farming at no loss). Appendix II, on the other 
hand, is a theoretical exercise, in a general- 
equilibrium framework, of the phenomena of 
export market disruption and provides the 
necessary analytical support to the compensa- 
tion schemes discussed in the text of the paper. 
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Thanks are due to Michael Pelcovits and Paul Krugman 
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I. THE CONCEPT OF MARKET DISRUPTION 
In a basic sense, market disruption is an old, 
protectionist concept: imports are considered 
disruptive of the domestic industry in the 
domestic market and hence must be curtailed 
and regulated. In this sense, virtually all imports 
are market-disrupting and indeed if one 
examines, in a ‘revealed preference’ fashion, the 
demands for protection by many industries in 
almost all countries, this loose and all- 
embracing version is, in fact, what would most 
nearly reflect the intent of the spokesmen for 
these industries. 
However, in an international economy 
which, in the post-war, post-GATT world has 
been geared to increasing trade liberalization, 
the institutions which have governed the use of 
protective devices for manufactures have taken 
a narrower view of market disruption. 
This is particularly true of the GATT, where 
Article XIX is designed to handle cases of 
‘serious injury’ to domestic industries and is set 
within the context of other rules designed to 
constrain the use of protection by member 
countries.’ 
It is correspondingly true also of national 
legislations which were enacted to correspond 
to Article XIX and related GATT provisions. 
Thus the US had established corresponding 
‘escape clause’ procedures by Executive Order 
9832 from 1947 to 1951, by Section 7 of the 
195 1 Trade Agreements Extension Act between 
1951 to 1962, and by Section 301 of the Trade 
Expansion Act from 1962.’ 
Under these legislations, for example, the 
successful invoking of protection required the 
public demonstration of injury, caused by 
tariff-concession-led imports, to the US Tariff 
Commission which would, in turn, convey its 
finding to the President who, in turn, could act 
on it, consistently with the national legislation 
and the GATT rules. 
On the other hand, as we shall discuss 
presently in greater detail, the national 
executive has often been willing to sidetrack 
GATT restrictions and associated national 
processes for seeking relief under market 
disruption and to invoke measures, outside of 
the GATT framework, to regulate the flow of 
such imports. The most potent such measure 
has been the VERs which have tended to 
proliferate since the 1950s. 
In consequence, it would be appropriate to 
say that, if we were to rank the different groups 
and institutions, seeking to define market 
disruption and to obtain relief from imports 
therewith, according to the degree of 
restrictiveness that they would apply to the 





executive < legislature 
in < in 
importing importing r 
in 
importing 






That is to say, the domestic industry, seeking 
relief from imports, would apply the least 
restrictive criteria to define market disruption; 
and the highest, in restrictiveness, would be the 
GATT, which seeks generally to minimize inter- 
ferences with expanding trade. In between are 
the national executives and legislatures whose 
relative actions and attitudes on the issue of 
market disruption are likely to vary. Thus, in 
the United States, the executive has been, via 
VERs, de facto less restrictive in the interpre- 
tation of market disruption, whereas the 
legislative statutes have been closer to GATT, as 
noted above. On the other hand, this is quite 
consistent with the legislative representatives, 
interested in specific industries in their 
constituencies, being the effective moving force 
in getting a free-trade-oriented ‘executive to 
enact the VERs. Hence one must distinguish 
between executive actions and legislation, on 
the one hand, and the executive and legislative 
bodies’ attitudes towards the issue of market 
disruption, on the other hand.3 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the 
loosest, industry-based view of market 
disruption would extend to all competition 
with imports in the domestic market and 
indeed no evidence of any serious injury would 
need to be established. Thus, as Metzger has 
noted, the provisions of HR 18970, the so- 
called US Trade Act of 1970, if it had become 
law, would have effectively elevated this view 
of market disruption to the status of the 
operating criterion for invoking protection 
(thus goins beyond what GATT Article XIX 
envisaged). The escape clause would have 
retained a Tariff Commission investigation but 
reduced the definition of injury to one where 
the domestic industry’s relative share in the 
domestic market had fallen, while also 
removing Presidential discretion in vetoing 
Tariff Commission recommendations for escape 
clause action.’ 
By contrast, Article XIX of GATT, as seen 
in Section II, restricts the ‘emergency action on 
imports of particular products’ to situations 
which satisfy three conditions: (i) that the 
alleged disruption should have been the result 
of ‘the obligations incurred by a contracting 
party under this Agreement, including tariff 
concessions’; (ii) that the product must be 
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imported in ‘increased quantities’; and (iii) that 
conditions must exist which ‘cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers’. While 
these conditions, and shifts in their interpreta- 
tion over time, are discussed in the next 
section, it is pertinent to note immediately that 
the GATT envisions a much narrower 
interpretation of market disruption and hence a 
correspondingly smaller scope for invoking 
legitimate interferences with imports. 
In keeping with this view of the matter, the 
associated national legislation has been 
relatively strict in interpreting market 
disruption as well. Thus, in the United States, 
the invoking of the escape clause has had to 
involve a public inquiry by the US Tariff 
Commission which had to apply legislated 
criteria, similar to those of Article XIX, to the 
case at hand: the US industries going the escape 
clause route have had to argue that concession- 
induced imports were causing serious injury, 
and have often failed to win their case. 
The invoking of protective devices by 
industries seeking curtailment of imports 
despite the GATT Article XIX and corres- 
ponding national legislations has therefore 
taken the route of executive action, typically in 
the form of VERs, outside of this framework; 
hence, the de facto definition of market 
disruption has turned out to be substantially 
closer to the importing industry’s viewpoint 
than the GATT rules might suggest. 
A review of the existing VERs, including the 
LTA governing the trade in textiles, reveals that 
the concept of market disruption that can 
successfully be invoked to get political, 
executive action in DCs tends to include the 
following ‘weakly restrictive’ features: 
(i) There need not be a sharp rise in imports; 
it is enough for the relative share of foreign 
imports to increase sharply in the domestic 
market. 
(ii) It is usually helpful to appeal to the 
notion that foreign competition is from ‘low- 
priced’ imports. The Europeans have the term 
‘abnormal competition’ to refer to this 
phenomenon and claim market disruption 
when, according to J. De Bandt, the import 
price is below the domestic price by ‘the 
portion of value added which they are unwilling 
to forego’.6 This is a strange notion indeed for 
economists to contemplate: after all, trade will 
reflect comparative advantage and imports will 
be effected when they are cheaper than 
domestic output. But it is a notion that is 
widely held and presumably is occasionally 
successful in getting protection. 
The reliance on criteria such as decline in 
domestic industry’s share in the domestic 
market and the need to compete with ‘low- 
priced’ imports have thus replaced the need to 
show that there is ‘serious injury’ in any other 
sense (e.g. that unemployment is rapidly 
resulting in the industry) and that it is 
attributable to increasing imports. 
Hence the matter has become of serious 
concern to LDCs whose (‘low-priced’, ‘low- 
cost’) exports have now come fairly 
significantly to face the prospect of market- 
disruption-induced restrictions and, indeed, are 
in some important cases (such as the LTA) 
already under such restraints.7 Therefore, prior 
to discussing the manner in which such 
prospects can be regulated and compensated 
for, it is necessary to examine in greater depth 
the history and present status of GATT rules on 
the subject, proceeding then to a fuller 
exploration of the growth of VERs and other 
restrictions outside of the GATT-and-related 
framework. 
II. GATT RULES AND NATIONAL 
LEGISLATIONS 
It is useful to put the current GATT rules on 
the phenomenon of ‘serious injury’, as 
applicable to market disruption, in historical 
perspective as also in relation to the rest of 
GATT articles. 
It is fair to say that GATT has had built into 
its basic structure an asymmetry under which 
agriculture has managed to be relatively easy to 
protect but interferences with trade in 
manufactures have been made more difficult. 
Thus, for example, the GATT Article XI is 
explicit in ruling out quotas as follows: 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licences or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any 
product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall not extend to the following: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions 
temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products 
essential to the exporting contracting party; 
(b) Import and export prohibitions or 
restrictions necessary to the application of 
standards or regulations for the classification, 
grading or marketing of commodities in inter- 
national trade; 
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(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or 
fisheries product, imported in any form, 
necessary to the enforcement of governmental 
measures which operate: 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like 
domestic product permitted to be marketed 
or produced, or, if there is no substantial 
domestic production of the like product, of 
a domestic product for which the imported 
product can be directed substituted; or 
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the 
like domestic product, or, if there is no 
substantial domestic production of the like 
product, of a domestic product for which 
the imported product can be directly 
substituted, by making the surplus available 
to certain groups of domestic consumers 
free of charge or at prices below the current 
market level; or 
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to 
be produced of any animal product the 
production of which is directly dependent, 
wholly or mainly, on the imported 
commodity, if the domestic production of 
that commodity is relatively negligible. 
It is clear from the above that the essential 
exemptions contemplated under Article XI.2 
relate to agricultural commodities (with 
domestic pricesupport programmes, etc.) and 
do not help manufacturing industries that 
desire protection. 
The basic protective outlet for manufactures 
(as distinct from Articles such as XII relating to 
balance of payments and XXI concerning 
security exceptions) which seek protection 
from imports on alleged grounds of ‘market 
disruption’ is provided under Article XIX 
whose full text states: 
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments 
and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a 
contracting party under this Agreement, including 
tariff concessions, any product is being imported 
into the territory of that contracting party in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as 
to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products, the contracting party shall 
be free, in respect of such product, and to the 
extent and for such time as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the 
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or 
modify the concession. 
(6) If any product, which is the subject of a con- 
cession with respect to a preference, is being 
imported into the territory of a contracting party 
in the circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) 
of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products in the territory of a 
contracting party which receives or received such 
preference, the importing contracting party shall 
be free, if that other contracting party so requests, 
to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession in 
respect of the product, to the extent and for such 
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy 
such injury. 
2. Before any contracting party shall take action 
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article, it shall give notice in writing to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as 
may be practicable and shall afford the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting 
parties having a substantial interest as exporters of 
the product concerned an opportunity to consult 
with it in respect of the proposed action. When 
such notice is given in relation to a concession with 
respect to a preference, the notice shall name the 
contracting party which has requested the action. 
In critical circumstances, where delay would cause 
damage which it would- be difficult to repair, 
action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be 
taken provisionally without prior consultation, on 
the condition that consultation shall be effected 
immediately after taking such action. 
3. (a) If agreement among the interested con- 
tracting parties with respect to the action is not 
reached, the contracting party which proposes to 
take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be 
free to do so, and if such action is taken or 
continued, the affected contracting parties shall 
then be free, not later than ninety days after such 
action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of 
thirty days from the day on which written notice 
of such suspension is received by the CON- 
TRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade 
of the contracting party taking such action, or, in 
the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this 
Article, to the trade of the contracting party 
requesting such action, of such substantially 
equivalent concessions or other obligations under 
this Agreement the suspension of which the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is 
taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without 
prior consultation and causes or threatens serious 
injury in the territory of a contracting party to the 
domestic producers of products affected by the 
action, that contracting party shall, where delay 
would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to 
suspend, upon the taking of the action and 
throughout the period of consultation, such 
concessions or other obligations as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. 
The GATT view of the invoking of ‘escape 
clause’ protection in the matter of market 
disruption, as implicit in Article XIX, was 
therefore traditionally a rather strict one. How- 
ever, its interpretation has been somewhat less 
strict than the language would suggest. 
Thus, the ‘unforeseen developments’ in 
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paragraph l(a) have been interpreted as 
inclusive of situations deriving from the 
fulfilment by a member of its obligations 
(under Articles III or IX).’ More important, the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘increased 
quantities’ in paragraph 1 has been formally 
agreed to as including the case where imports 
may have increased only relatively to domestic 
production (as, in fact, was explicit in the 
corresponding Havana Charter, Article 40 
text). Finally, the Article clearly states that 
the relaxation of commitments under it will be 
‘for such time as may be necessary’: this, in 
turn, has been clarified to imply that while the 
expectation is one of short-term, temporary 
invoking of protection, the phrasing does allow 
for longer and continuous invoking of Article 
XIX.’ O 
But, subject to these liberal interpretations, 
the scope of Article XIX is essentially narrow. 
Basically, it does require that concession-led 
increasing imports be a cause of serious injury. 
It also builds into the mechanism the possibility 
of compensation to the exporting member 
countries that thereby lose the tariff con- 
cessions that are to be suspended: reflecting, of 
course, the fact that Article XIX explicitly 
pertains to imports of articles on which a 
concession had earlier been granted and which 
is being suspended by the invoking of Article 
XIX.’ l 
Of these two restrictive aspects of Article 
XIX, it is the former that has caused the critical 
difficulty for industries seeking relief from 
imports, by claiming market disruption, under 
national legislations. Thus, in the United States 
(until the 1974 legislation), for example, the 
escape clause actions (under the US legislations, 
noted in Section I) have been remarkably 
unsuccessful, as is evident from Table 1. Thus, 
of 134 investigations instituted by the 
Commission until 1962, the process terminated 
in Presidential invocation of the escape clause 
in only 15 cases, with yet more dramatic failure 
rates for the post-1962 period! 
The result has been a rather limited resort to 
GATT Article XIX for relief by industries 
alleging market disruption; national legislations 
and processes, reflecting the tougher criteria of 
Article XIX, have eliminated the bulk of the 
protectionist demands under the broad 
umbrella of ‘market disruption’. The corres- 
ponding paucity of actions under Article XIX is 
therefore only natural and can be inferred from 
Table 2 which lists by country, the invoking (in 
terms of both frequency and commodity 
composition) of Article XIX until 1970. 
It may also be noted that the invoking of 
Article XIX has generally taken the form of an 
increase in bound tariffs and, to a lesser degree 
(in about a third of the cases), of the 
imposition of QRs.’ ’ Furthermore, it has been 
estimated that the developing countries’ 
exports were involved in more than half of the 
developed countries’ invoking of Article XIX. 
The restrictions imposed in these cases were 
removed within a year in a third of the cases 
involving developing countries whereas in half 
the total number of cases, the measures had 
been in force for over five years. 
III. GROWTH AND EXISTENCE OF 
PRINCIPAL FORMS OF MARKET- 
DISRUPTION-RELATED INSTRUMENTS 
OF PROTECTION 
Basically, therefore, national governments in 
DCs responding to the protectionist pressures 
from their industries, have responded in two 
principal ways: (1) by trying to weaken the 
restrictive nature of GATT rules on market 
disruption; and (2) by bypassing the GATT 
framework altogether. 
Of these, the former has been the less 
important and has, in fact, not resulted in any 
major changes at the GATT to date. Apparently 
the first public reference to ‘market disruption’ 
specifically appears to have been made by the 
United States, via Mr. Douglas Dillon in Tokyo 
at the 15th GATT session in 1959.’ 3 This was 
to lead to the appointment of a GATT working 
party in June 1960, to examine the issue of 
market disruption. Their initial efforts 
amounted to defining market disruption to 
include four elements ‘in combination’: ’ 4 
(i) a sharp and substantial increase or 
potential increase of imports of particular 
products from particular sources; 
(ii) these products are offered at prices 
which are substantially below those prevailing 
for similar goods of comparable quality in the 
market of the importing country; 
(iii) there is serious damage to domestic 
producers or threat thereof; 
(iv) the price differentials referred to in 
paragraph (ii) above do not arise from govem- 
mental intervention in the fixing or formation 
of prices or from dumping practices. 
The Working Party advocated a multilateral 
and ‘constructive’ approach towards this 
problem, which would permit trade expansion. 
Its recommendation that there be a permanent 
Committee on Market Disruption was accepted 
and this Committee, in collaboration with the 
international Labour Office, was to consider 
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Table 1. Escape-clause actions in the United States, 
1947-1962.1963-1969and 1970-1973 
(A) Outcome or current status of escape-clause investigations 
initiated by the United States Tam.ff Commission as of 1 July I9621 
Investigations instituted by the commission 
Investigations dismissed by the commission at applicant’s request 
Knit gloves and mittens, wool (6-O) (11 July 195 1) 
Hard-fibre cords and twines (4-O) (14 Jan. 1953) 
Fluorspar (1st investigation) (64) (23 Nov. 1953) 
Wood screws (4th investigation) (4-O) (9 Apr. 1956) 
Cotton blouses (5-O) (22 June 1956) 
Certain cotton cloth (gingham) (5-O) (29 Jan. 1957) 
Creeping red fescue seed (6-O) (1 June 1961) 
Umbrella frames (2nd investigation) (3-O) (21 Sept. 1961) 
Umbrellas (3-O) (21 Sept. 1961) 
134 
9 
Investigations terminated by the commission without formal findings 9 
Straight pins (1st investigation) (6-O) (22 June 1954) 
Safety pins (1st investigation) (6-O) (22 June 1954) 
Leather handbags (6-O) (14 Mar. 1956) 
Toyo cloth caps (44) (21 June 1957) 
Fine-mesh wire cloth (3-2) (14 July 1958) 
Nails, spikes, tacks, brads and staples (6-O) (12 Mar. 1959) 
Galvanized fencing wire and galvanized wire fencing (610) (12 Mar. 1959) 
Broadwoven silk fabrics (5-O) (26 June 1959) 
Tennis rackets (4-2) (19 Apr. 1961) 
Investigations in which decisions by the commission are pending 4 
Vamllill 
Household china tableware and kitchenware 
Earthenware table and kitchen articles 
Hatters’ fur (3rd investigation) 
Investigations completed by the commission 
Investigations in which the commission dismissed the apphcations after 
preiiminary inquiry under procedure provided for in Executive orders 
(no reports issued) 
Marrok (44) (27 Aug. 1948) 
Whiskies and snirits (54) (3 Jan. 1949) 
Crude petroleum and petroleum products (4-2) (3 May 1949) 
Hops (4-2) (11 May 1949) 
Knitted berets (1st investigation) (3-3) (8 July 1949) 
Sponges (3-3) (22 July 1949) 
Narcissus Bulbs (6-O) (13 Jan. 1950) 
Knitted berets (2nd investigation) (5-l) (13 Jan. 1950) 
Reeds (5-O) (17 Feb. 1950) 
112 
14 
Beef and veal (3-3) (30 June 1950) 
Silk woven fabrics (5-O) (21 Sept. 1950) 
Aluminum and alloys (6-O) (21 Nov. 1950) 
Lead (54) (25 Jan. 1951) 
Stencil silk, dyed or colored (6-O) (7 June 1951) 
Investigations in which the commission decided against escape action 
(no reports sent to the President) 
Spring clothespins (1st investigation) (5-l) (20 Dec. 1949) 
Wood screws (1st investigation) (4-2) (29 Dec. 1951) 
Blue-mould cheese (5-l) (12 June 1952) 
Motorcycles and parts (4-2) (16 June 1952) 
Spring clothespins (2nd investigation) (3-2) (21 Aug. 1952) 
Goundtish fillets (1st investigation).(3-2) (4 Sept. 1952) 
Bicycles and parts (1st investigation) (5-O) (9 Oct. 1952) 
Glace cherries (3-2) (17 Oct. 1952) 
Bonito and tuna, not in oil (3-2) (26 Nov. 1952) 
Household china tableware (4-O) (5 Feb. 1953) 
51 
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Wood screws (2nd investigation) (3-l) (27 Mar. 1953) 
Pregnant mares’ urine (44) (2 Apr. 1953) 
Chalk whiting (3-l) (9 Apr. 1953) 
Woodwind musical instruments (5-O) (28 Apr. 1953) 
Cotton-carding machinery (5-O) (29 July 1953) 
Metal watch bracelets and parts (6-O) (20 Aug. 1953) 
Rosaries (6-O) (21 Aug. 1953) 
Mustard seeds (6-O) (10 Dec. 1953) 
Ground chicory (5-O) (7 Sept. 1954) 
Coconuts (6-O) (25 Oct. 1954) 
Wool gloves and mittens (5-l) (28 Dec. 1954) 
Hardwood olvwood (1st investiaation) (5-O) (2 June 1955) 
Red fescue-seed (1st &rvestigati&) (4-o) (22 June 1955) 
Dressed rabbit furs (6-O) (29 Feb. 1956) 
Cotton pillowcases (3-2) (21 Nov. 1956) 
Certain jute fabrics (5-O) (15 May 1957) 
Bicycles (3rd investigation) (64) (19 Aug. 1957) 
Wool feldt, non-woven (5-O) (6 Jan. 1958) 
Garlic (2nd investigation) (5-O) (19 Feb. 1958) 
Barium chloride (6-O) (10 Oct. 1958) 
Certain carpets and rugs (1st investigation) (3-2) (12 Jan. 1959) 
Scissors and shears (2nd investigation) (64) (25 Feb. 1959) 
Handmade glassware (2nd inve&gatidn) (6%) (21 May 1959) 
Axes and axe heads (5-O) (21 May 1959) 
Calf and kip leather (54) (21 May 1959) 
Hardwood plywood (2nd investigation) (4-2) (22 June 1959) 
Mink skins (6-O) (17 Sept. 1959) 
Red fescue seed (2nd investigation) (5-O) (28 Oct. 1959) 
Zinc sheet (3-2) (14 Jan. 1960) 
Women’s and children’s leather aloves (5-O) (21 Mar. 1960) 
Typewriters (6-O) (10 May 1966) 
Lamb, mutton, sheep and lambs (4-2) (1 June 1960) 
Barbed wire (4-O) (3 Aug. 1960) 
Cast-iron soil-pipe fittings (64) (23 Aug. 1960) 
Crude horseradish (6-O) (15 Sept. 1960) 
Hatters’ fur (2nd investigation) (6-O) (7 Oct. 1960) 
Iron ore (5-O) (30 Dec. 1960) 
Ultramarine blue (6-O) (16 Mar. 1961) 
Plastic raincoats (4-2) (29 Mar. 1961) 
Cantaloups (6-O) (30 Mar. 1961) 
Cellulose filaments (rayon staple fibre) (4-2) (10 Apr. 1961) 
Watermelons (6-O) (20 Apr. 1961) 
Rolled glass (3-2-l)* (25 May 1961) 
Procaine and salts and compounds thereof (3-O) (2 Nov. 1961) 
Standard clothespins (5-O) (14 Feb. 1962) 
Creeping red fescue seed (2nd investigation) (3-2) (21 May 1962) 
Investigations in which the vote of the commission was evenly divided 
(reports sent to the President) 
Handmade blown glassware (1st investigation) (3-3) (22 Sept. 1953) 
Spring clothespins (3rd investigation) (3-3) (6 Oct. 1954) 
Wood screws (3rd investigation) (3-3) (27 Oct. 1954) 
Fluorspar (2nd investigation) (3-3) (18 Jan. 1956) 
Para-aminosahcyclic acid (3-3) (14 June 1956) 
Binding twines (2-2) (9 Dec. 1960) 
Hard-fibre cords and twines (2nd investigation) (2-2) (9 Dec. 1960) 
Alsike clover seed (2nd investigation) (2-2) (7 Aug. 1961) 
Investigations in which the commission decided ?n favour of escape action 
(reports sent to the President) 
Women’s fur felt hats and hat bodies (5-O) (25 Sept. 1950) 
Hatters’ fur (1st investigation) (6-O) (9 Nov. 1951) 
Garlic (1st investiaation) (4-2) (6 June 1952) 
Watches (1st investigation) (4-2) (14 June 1952) 
Dried figs (5-O) (24 July 1952) 
Tobacco pipes and bowls (4-O) (22 Dec. 1952) 
33 
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Screen-printed silk scarves (4-O) (13 Apr. 1953) 
Scissors and shears (1st investigation) (4-2) (12 Mar. 1954) 
GroundfBh fillets (2nd investigation (3-2) (7 May 1954) 
Lead and zinc (1st investigation) (6-O) (21 May 1954) 
Alsike clover seed (1st investiaation) (6-O) (21 May 1954) 
Watches (2nd investigation) (i-2) (28‘May i954) _ 
Bicycles (2nd investigation) (4-l) (14 Mar. 1955) 
Ferrocerium (lighter flints) (6-O) (21 Dec. 1955) 
Toweling of tlax, hemp, or ramie (64) (15 May 1956) 
Groundfish fillets (3rd investigation) (6-O) (12 Oct. 1956) 
Velveteen fabrics (6-O) (24 Oct. 1956) 
Vtolins and violas (3-2) (29 Jan. 1957) 
Straight pins (2nd un&&ation) (4-2)(30 Jan. 1957) 
Safety pins (2nd investigation) (4-2) (30 Jan. 1957) 
Spring clothespins (4th investigation) (4-l) (10 Sept. 1957) 
Stainless steel table flatware (6-O) (10 Jan. 1958) 
Umbrella frames (1st investigation) (3-2) (14 Jan. 1958) 
Clinical thermometers (3-2) (21 Feb. 1958) 
Lead and zinc (2nd investigation) (6-O) (24 Apr. 1958) 
Tartaric acid (5-O) (14 Jan. 1959) 
Cream of tartar (3-2) (14 Jan. 1959) 
Cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth (4-O) (30 June 1960) 
Baseball and softball gloves (6-O) (1 May 1961) 
Ceramic mosaic tile (6-O) (10 May 1961) 
Sheet glass (6-O) (17 May 1961) 
Certain carpets and rugs (2nd investigation) (4-O) (3 Aug. 1961) 
Straight pins (3rd investigation) (4-2) (28 Feb. 1962) 
Action by the Resident on recommendations of the commission in favour of 
escape action 
Resident invoked the escape clause 
Women’s fur felt hats and hat bodies (30 Oct. 1950) 
Hatters’ fur (5 Jan. 1952) 
Dried figs (16 Aug. 1952) 
AJsike clover seed (1st investigation) (30 June 1954) 
Watches (2nd investigation) (27 July 1954) 
Bicycles (2nd investigation) (18 Aug. 1955) 
Toweling, of flax, hemp, or ramie (25 June 1956) 
Spring clothespins (4th investigation) (9 Nov. 1957) 
Safety pins (2nd investigation) (29 Nov. 1957) 
Clinical thermometers (21 Apr. 1958) 
Lead and zinc (2nd investigation) (22 Sept. 1958) 
Stainless steel table flatware (20 Oct. 1959) 
Cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth (23 Aug. 1960) 
Sheet glass (19 Mar. 1962) 
Certain carpets and rugs (2nd investigation) (19 Mar. 1962) 
President declined to invoke the escape clause 
Garlic (1st investigation) (21 July 1952) 
Watches (1st investigation) (14 Aug. 1952) 
Tobacco pipes and bowls (10 Nov. 1953) 
Scissors and shears (1st investigation) (11 May 1954) 
Groundfish ftiets (2nd investigation) (2 July 1954) 
Lead and zinc (1st investigation) (20 Nov. 1954) 
Handmade blown glassware (1st investigation) (9 Sept. 1954) 
Spring clothespins (3rd investigation) (20 Nov. 1954) 
Screen-printed silk scarves (23 Dec. 1954) 
Wood screws (3rd investigation) (23 Dec. 1954) 
Fluorspar (2nd investigation) (20 Mar. 1956) 
Para-aminosalicylic acid (10 Aug. 1956) 
Ferrocerium (lighter flints) (13 Nov. 1956) 
Groundfish fillets (3rd investigation) (IO Dec. 1956) 
Velveteen fabrics (22 Jan. 1957) 
Straight pins (2nd investigation) (29 Mar. 1957) 
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Umbrella frames (1st investigation) (30 Sept. 1958) 
Tartaric acid (14 Mar. 1959) 
Cream of tartar (14 Mar. 1959) 
Binding twines (7 Feb. 1961) 
Hard-fibre cords and twines (2nd investigation) (7 Feb. 1961) 
Alsike clover seed (2nd investigation) (1 Oct. 1961) 
Baseball and softball gloves (19 Mar. 1962) 
Ceramic mosaic tile (19 Mar. 1962) 
Straight pins (3rd investigation) (28 Apr. 1962) 
(B) Escape-clause actions, 1963-I 969 
There were 25 applications for escape-clause r lief during 1963-1969, all of which were 
rejected. 






Industry Tariff Commission ruling Residential action 
Canned sardines No relief justified None 
Pianos Yes Delay in tariff reduction 
Flat glass Tie vote Delay in tariff reduction 
Barbers’ chairs Tie vote None 
Umbrellas No None 
Non-rubber footwear Tie vote ? 
Billiard and pool balls No None 
Marble and travertine 
products Tie vote None 
TV receivers No None 
Earthenware Yes None 
Fine china No None 
Sheet glass Tie vote None 
Other flat glass No None 
Electron microscopes No None 
Brass wind instruments Tie vote None 
Source: United States Tariff Commission; in William Kelly (1963), especially the paper 
by Leddy and Norwood, Chapter 3. 
Notes: 
1. ‘The vote of the commission (where applicable) and the date of the particular 
action are shown in parentheses. 
2. Three commissioners found no injury; two commissioners found injury; one 
commissioner found a threat of injury. 
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the economic, social and commercial as ects of 
market disruption and report on it. I!? As it 
happened, this Report never materialized and, 
in fact, the most important market disruption 
type restriction that soon materialized, the 
LTA (Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Inter- 
national Trade in Cotton Textiles), was to be 
negotiated in 1962 quite without regard to this 
Committee! In the years that have elapsed since 
then, the GATT has not managed to regulate 
market disruption any more than the DCs have 
managed to alter the basic GATT framework to 
accommodate less restrictive criteria for 
invoking market-disruption-related protection. 
The fact is that the alternative route of 
bypassing the GATT altogether to successfully 
seek restraints on trade in cases of market 
disruption defined far more weakly than in 
GATT, is the one that has been chosen by DCs. 
And the most fashionable policy instrument 
chosen has been the VERs, ironically described 
as ‘voluntary’ but, in fact, imposed on reluctant 
exporting countries threatened with more 
drastic treatment in the absence of the VERs. 
And the most serious of the VERs, those on 
cotton textiles, have been formally signed 
multilaterally into continuing quantitative 
restrictions under the LTA. 
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Table 2. Invoking of GATT clause XIX until 1970 





Copper brass sheet and strip 
Forged steel flanges 
Four-wheel-drive vehicles 
Heat-resisting lassware 
Knitted coats, jumpers, cardigans, 





Polyethylene and polypropylene 
twine, cordage, rope and cable 
















Foundry pig iron 
Horse meat 
Germany, Fed. Rep. of 
Hard coal and hard coal products 
Petroleum and shale oil 
Concession suspended 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Reneaotiation under Article XXVIII 
Introduction of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Introduction of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 





Introduction of special valuation 
Termination of special valuation 
Concession suspended 
Concession restored 
Introduction of special valuation 
Compensation to United States and 
termination of special valuation 
Concession suspended 
(Concession restored after expiry 
of time limit) 
Introduction of special valuation 
Termination of special valuation 
Concession suspended 
Introduction of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 
Introduction of restriction 











Lead arsenate and valves for 
industrial purposes 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland 





Alsike clover seed 
Bicycles 
Clinical thermometers 
Cotton typewriter ribbon cloth 
Dried figs 
Hatters’ fur 




Spring clothes pins 
Stainless steel flatware 
Toweling of flax, hemp or ramie 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Corn&ion suspended 




Introduction of restriction 
Partial removal of restriction 
introduction of restriction 
Concessions uspended 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction (by Rhodesia) 
Introduction of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Compensation to United States 
Compensation to Canada 
Compensation to EEC 
Concession suspended 
Concession restored (after expiry 
of extension) 
Concession suspended 




Compensation to United Kingdom 
Concession restored 
Concession suspended 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Concession suspended 
Concession restored 
Introduction of restriction 
Removal of restriction 
Concession suspended 
Concession suspended 
Compensation to United Kingdom 
and Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Concession restored 
Concession suspended 
Compensation to United Kingdom 
Compensation to Japan 
Partial restoration 
Compensation to Sweden 
Concession suspended 





Compensation to United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Netherlands 
Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
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Wilton and velvet carpets Concession suspended 
Compensation to United Kingdom 
Compensation to Japan 
Partial restoration 
Women’s fur felt hats and hat Concession suspended 
bodies Renegotiation under Article XXVIII 
Application of Paragraph 3 in specific cases 
Belgium 
Suspension of concession on mastics 
in connection with United States’ 
action on hatters’ fur 
Concession restored 
European Economic Community 
Suspension of concession on varnishes 
and lacquers in connection with 
United States action on Wiiton 
carpets and glass 
Partial restoration of concession 
Turkey 
Suspension of concessions on various 
articles in connection with United 
States action on dried figs 
United States 
Proposed suspension of concessions 
on various articles in connection 
with Austria’s action on oilcakes 
(not implemented) 
Agreement for maintenance of 
obligations and rights between 
Austria and United States 
Source: Analytical Index, Third Revision (March 1970). Notes on the Drafting, 
Interpretation and Application of the Articles of the General Agreement, GATT 
(1970-71, pp. 109-114). 
Note: Further details on these cases, including dates of introduction, termination 
or renegotiation, plus whether tariffs or QRs were imposed, are available at the 
GATT Secretariat, in unpublished form. 
Table 3. The relationship between Japanese 
voluntary export restraints and United States 
escape-clause investigations 
Items subject to Items in previous 
Japanese voluntary escape-clause 
export restraints action 
Finding in previous 
escape-clause 
action 
1. Bicycle parts Bicycle parts Negative 
2. Malleable cast-iron Cast-iron soil-pipe Negative 
joints fittings 




invoked escape clause) 
Third investigation: 
Negative 
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4. Thermometers 
5. *Wood screws 
6. Gloves, woollen, 
knitted 
7. Scarves, silk and 
rayon 
8. Silk fabrics 
9. Flatware, stainless 
steel 
10. Gloves and mittens, 
baseball use 
11. Raincoats, vinyl 
12. Smoking accessories 
13. Tableware, hard 
porcelain 
14. Umbrellas 
15. *Umbrella frames 
16. *Glass and crystal 
ware 
17. Rosaries 








Silk woven fabrics 
Stainless steel table 
flatware 
Baseball and softball 
gloves 
Plastic raincoats 








Ceramic mosaic tiles 
Positive (President 







(President declined to 
invoke escape clause) 
Dismissed (at applicant’s 
request) 
Positive (President 
declined to invoke 
escape clause) 
Dismissed (after pre- 
liminary inquiry) 
Positive (President 
invoked escape clause) 
Positive (President 




declined to invoke 
escape clause) 
Negative 




declined to invoke 
escape clause) *
Second investigation: 




(President declined to 





declined to invoke 
escape clause) 
Source: Constructed from Lynch (1968, p. 200) and Kelly (1963, pp. 
169-173) by John Cheh (1974, Table W-2). 
* Where a product had been subjected to more than one escape-clause 
investigation, we write the finding in italics. 
Before discussing the scope of these VERs, it clause route first; this is true, for example, of 
is interesting to note that an analysis of the US cotton textiles in the US, now under the LTA! 
VERs, as in Table 3, shows how industries that In fact, the great advantage of VERs is that the 
failed to win protection by the escape clause industry does not have to satisfy the relatively 
route then proceeded, through executive stringent requirements such as the demonstra- 
action, to secure VERs on imports (from tion to an officially-designated agency (e.g. the 
Japan) - the correlation is revealing. At the US Tariff Commission) of serious injury from 
same time, note that several industries with concession-led increase in imports: all that is 
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one’s government and, in turn, the latter’s clout 
with the government and/or traders of the 
exporting countries. As Metzger has put it 
pointedly in relation to the historical Potato 
Agreement of 1948 between the US and 
Canada, an early example of VERs: 
On the US side, strong domestic interests desired 
to protect themselves against competitive imports. 
They either believed that they could not qualify 
for escape clause relief (i.e. Cotton Textiles, Man- 
made Textile Fibres, Shoes), or, if they might 
qualify for National Security Amendment relief 
(i.e. Steel), they were aware of the foreign relations 
problems involved in imposing unilateral quotas, 
which are often considered to be ‘unfriendly’ acts 
by America’s trading partners. Cognizant 
Congressional Committees, made aware of these 
problems by their own experience no less than by 
that communicated by the Chief Executive, have 
not desired to force the Administration’s hand by 
passing mandatory legislative quotas; indeed, they 
have had grave doubts that in the last analysis they 
could muster the strength to repass such a bill over 
a determined Chief Executive. Yet they, like the 
Administration, have been loath to treat all 
domestic industries - those with and those 
without major political strength - alike. Those 
without sufficient domestic political strength have 
simply had to live with the foreign competition 
which cannot be stemmed under generally 
applicable domestic legal criteria. Those with such 
strength have secured the extraordinary remedy of 
the United States raising to the highest inter- 
national negotiating levels the matter of securing 
curtailment of imports from friendly foreign 
countries, developing and developed alike, in the 
interest of those who cannot show, or at any rate 
have not attempted to show, serious injury in 
consequence of increased importation. 
Indeed, similar exertion of political muscle 
by industry and, in turn, by government against 
the exporting country were to mark the four 
early VERs between Japan and the US in the 
1930s.’ 6 
Information regarding VERs is, by the 
standards of international trade data, 
occasionally difficult to come by: this is in the 
nature of the case, given the extra-GATT- 
framework, political arm-twisting that precedes 
their incidence. Such data as are available for 
Canada have been put together by Henry and 
reproduced here in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 
relates exclusively to cotton textiles and shows 
both the specific nature of the quotas and the 
negligible growth rates allowed in them 
annually in nearly all cases. Table 5 gives for 
1968 the countrywise incidence of VERs, 
extends the data to non-textiles and shows that 
even (from Canada’s viewpoint) the most 
favourable ratio of total imports under VERs to 
total imports, runs as high as 38.7% for Korea, 
28.4% for the UAR and almost 21% for Hong 
Kong and Greece.’ ’ 
For the United States, on the other hand, we 
have Magee’s estimates which are seen, in Table 
6, to yield an estimated value of trade (affected 
by VERs) as exceeding $5 bilhon in 1971 - a 
figure that, as one would expect, exceeds 
greatly the Canadian 1968 estimate of $57 
million (Canadian). 
On the other hand, Canada and the United 
States are only two of many DCs practicing 
VERs. This is seen most clearly from Table 7 
which gives the list of Japanese VERs, other 
than the major ones on textiles and steel, by 
country of destination for July 1971 .r ’ And, 
of course, many DCs are party to the VERs on 
textiles and steel. 
By far the most important existing, as 
distinct from potential, VERs relate to textiles 
and currently are embodied in the Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Textiles, 
negotiated by some 50 governments in 1973 
and entering into force on 1st January 1974. 
This arrangement goes back proximately, in 
essence, to the initial Short-Term Arrangement 
(STA) that was negotiated in 1961 at US 
initiative and remained in force between 
October 1961 and September 1962, and which 
then was to be succeeded by the LTA which 
was to be repeatedly renegotiated. The original 
agreements were restricted to cotton textiles 
whereas the latest agreement extends to ‘wool, 
man-made fibres, or blend thereof’.” 
Table 6. Major US imports subject to 
voluntary export restraints and 
import ,quotas. I9 71 




Dairy products 70 
Total 4,161 
Cotton textiles 590 




Source: Stephen P. Magee (1972, p. 662); cited 
also in Fred Bergsten (1975). 
a. 1969 figure, excluding several categories of steel 
products covered by the VERS. Thus the figure for 
total VER coverage should be somewhat higher. In 




Table I. Japanese voluntary quantitative export controls on products, other than 
textiles and steel, by country of destination, as of July I9 71. 
Countries of Destination 
Bicycles 
Stainless steel knives, forks and spoons 
Silk fabrics All countries, except Iran, Iraq. Nansei Islands, Okinawa, S. America and 
Zoris made of rubber sponge 
Umbrellas 
Umbrella ribs and stretchers 
Baseball or softball gloves and mitts 
Badminton rackets and frames 
Ceramics (tableware, kitchen utensiIs, 
personal effects, ornaments, smokers’ 
supplies toys, stationery)t 
Glazed ceramic waB tile? 
Ceramic mosaic tiles 
Flatwaret 
Iron and steel wood screws 
Frozen swordfuh 
Iodine and iodine products 
Binoculars 
Household sewing machines 
Canned mandarin oranges 
Fresh mandarin orrngest 
Tuna, canned in brine 
Fresh or frozen tuna 
Batteries with manganese layer 
Polyvinyl chloride leather 




Rubber shoes (excluding rubber beach 
sandals) and shoes made of textiles 
with rubber soles 
United States, Canada, and Mexico 
United States, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, W. Germany, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Portugal, Rep. of Korea, 
S. Vietnam, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand and 
the United Kingdom 
Africa 
United States and Canada 
United States, W. Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
United States, France, Italy, W. Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
United States, Canada and Hawaii 
United States, Italy, France, W. Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
AB countries, except U.K., Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, S. Rhodesia and Nansei Islands 
United States and Benelux 
United States, W. Germany and Canada 
AB countries, except Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, S. Rhodesia and Nansei Islands 
United States, Norway, Sweden, U.K., Denmark, Ireland, Benelux, France, 
W. Germany, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Austria 
United States and Canada 
AB countries, except Nansci IsIands 
All countries, except Nanri lsknds 
United States and Canada 
United States, U.K., Canada, Belgium, W. Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Switzerland and Denmark 
Canada 
United States 
American Samoa, British and French New Hebrides. Malaysia and Dutch St. 
Martin Island 




Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, S. Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines 
AU countries, except African countries (other than the UAR and Rep. of S. Africa), 
United States and Nansei Is!ands 
Benelux 
Source: Department of State Airgram Number A-567 from American Embassy in Tokyo dated 21 July 1971; and the US 
Tariff Commission. 
l In addition to the items listed above as having voluntary quantitative export controls, the following items have both export 
and domestic shipment controls: cellophane, high quality paper, coated paper, rolled light metal products, selenium, maBe- 
able cast bon joints, shoveIs, scoops, western style farm instruments, gas pipe, fence tube, ferro-chromium, ferro-manganese, 
dry batteries, 8 mm. fti, editing machines, TV receivers, sulphur, paint, explosives, caustic soda, methanol, acetic acid, soda 
sulphide, and certain polyethylene resins. 
t In addition to quantitative restrictions, other factors are controlled, such as price, design, evidence of bona tide importer. 
and type of transaction. 
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The VERs, including the Arrangement in 
regard to Textiles, suggest certain broad 
characteristics and conclusions. 
(i) They can be invoked successfully at 
extremely low levels of imports, both 
absolutely and as a share of domestic 
absorption. Thus, the early VERs on textiles 
from Japan, imposed by the US in the 193Os, 
were at a time when total imports of textiles 
into the US were no more than 3% of domestic 
production and total imports from Japan were 
only about l%.” During 195 l-62, straddling 
the renewal of such VERs in mid-1950s, the 
shares were, if anything, even lower. Similarly, 
the steel VERs invoked by the US have also 
been in the face of imports as low as 17 million 
tons against domestic production of 141 
million tons in 1969.2 ’
(ii) The industries profiting from VERs 
almost always allege fears of ‘low-price’ imports 
offering undue competition and threatening 
injury, rather than actually causing it.22 
(iii) The length of duration of the VERs, at a 
time, would seem to be around one year but 
can go to as far as five years. In several cases, 
they have been renewed beyond the period of 
first imposition2 3 Some have been allowed to 
lapse as well, 
(iv) The VERs are an inefficient instrument, 
compared to domestic tariffs or quotas, in 
restricting imports. The principal cause is that 
VERs apply to specific exporters and they 
cannot effectively rule out new suppliers from 
entering the market. In consequence, the 
progress of most VERs on specific countries 
(with notable exceptions as in the case of US 
VERs on steel) has been towards increasing 
coverage of other exporters and, in the case of 
textiles, to a fully multilateral arrangement of 
exporters and importers.24 In other cases, such 
as Canada, there is ‘back-up’ legislation in case 
VERs fail to hold back imports effectively.2s 
(v) While the VERs build in permissible rates 
of growth of exports from specific countries, 
these are invariably controlled at low levels.- 
Thus the latest Arrangement on Textiles builds 
in a ceiling of 6% (as against the earlier 5%) but, 
at the same time allows for an escape route 
(seized under the earlier Arrangement by 
Canada, for example, at 3%) under which a 
‘lower positive growth rate may be applied’.26 
(vi) Furthermore, there is literally no 
sanction against the expansion of capacity in 
the domestic industry of the importing country 
while the VERs operate. This is the case even 
for the 1974 Arrangement in Textiles; and, in 
fact, while the earlier LTA operated, the 
exported LDCs noted and complained about 
the growth of such capacity in member DCs to 
no avail. Therefore VERs are, in this respect, 
one-sided. 
(vii) Finally, unlike the compensation 
possibility in the GATT Article XIX, there is 
practically no evidence that any of the existing 
and past VERs have incorporated explicit 
compensation to the countries whose export 
markets are being disrupted.2 ’
IV. IMPACT OF ‘EXPORT MARKET 
DISRUPTION’ ON WELFARE OF 
EXPORTING LDCs 
The threat of protectionist restrictions being 
invoked by the importing countries, on grounds 
of market disruption, can be shown to impose a 
welfare loss on the exporting countries, as is in 
fact done in the theoretical Appendix II. 
It is shown there that, taking expected 
utilities, economic welfare of the exporting 
country will be less than if there were no such 
threat. It is also shown that if the exporting 
country, in turn, reacts with an optimal policy 
intervention in the nature of restricted exports 
so as to reduce the probability of VERs or 
other such market-disruption-related restric- 
tions being invoked, then the reduction in 
welfare from the threat of such invocations will 
be less than if the exporting country took no 
such action: but the loss will still be there. And, 
furthermore, if investment allocations cannot 
be costlessly readusted, once in place, then the 
presence of such ‘adjustment costs’ will further 
increase the loss of welfare from the threat of 
such trade restraints. Finally, the actual 
invoking of the trade restraints would inflict a 
welfare loss on the exporting country that 
would exceed the expected loss from the threat 
of such an invocation at a future date. 
From these general theoretical propositions, 
certain compensatory proposals would seem to 
follow. 
(1) First, there is a case for asking importing 
DCs to compensate the exporting LDCs faced 
with mere threots of market-disruption-related 
trade restraints. The DCs can reasonably be 
asked to ‘buy’, with compensation payments, 
the right to invoke a market-disruption-related 
trade restraint on a product, and to forego the 
right to resort to such trade restraints on all 
products not so bought for. Thus a list of 
‘restrainable’ items can be prepared under 
multilateral auspices, such as GATT, and the 
compensation required for affected exporters, 
whose welfare is correspondingly reduced, would 
have to be paid to put a product on such a list. 
1008 WORLDDEVELOPMENT 
(2) Second, the actual invoking of such 
restraints, by imposing a greater loss, would 
equally call for further compensation to the 
affected exporters. 
Compensation, for potential and actual 
export market disruption, to the exporting 
countries affected by trade restraints related to 
market disruption would thus be the natural 
consequence of our analysis. In the next section 
(V) therefore, we consider the possible rules in 
this regard in greater depth, proceeding in the 
final section (VI) to consider the implications 
that these rules would have for modifications in 
GATT Article XIX and related provisions. 
V. COMPENSATION FOR EXPORT MARKET 
DISRUPTION, POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL: 
SUGGESTED RULES 
The rules for compensation for market- 
disruption-related trade restraints can then be 
defined on a number of dimensions as follows. 
(1) Penalty/compensation for potential 
restn’ction 
In accordance with the arguments of the 
preceding section, a list of ‘items potentially 
subject to market-disruption-related trade 
restrictions’ ought to be maintained. This list 
may be described as the List of Potentially 
Restrainable Items.’ 8 For putting an item on 
such a list, the DCs would be required to pay a 
‘penalty’ which can be utilized to compensate 
the exporting countries subject to welfare loss 
from the threat of trade restraints on the item. 
(2) Penalty/compensation for actual invoking 
of trade restraints on potentially restrainable 
items 
Moreover, as and when the trade restraints 
are actually invoked, there should be a further 
penalty which should be used for compensating 
the exporting country whose export market is 
thus restrained.2g The penalty so imposed, if it 
is to reflect the compensation to be paid to the 
exporting countries, must then be less than the 
actual cost of the trade restraint by the 
adjusted sum already paid for putting the item, 
in the first place, on the list of potentially 
restrainable items. 
(3) Escape clause from list of potentially 
restrainable items 
While the preceding two rules should, in 
principle, divide all items into those that are 
restrainable and those that are not, this is 
politically inadequate. There will almost 
certainly be cases where unforeseen and 
politically unmanageable difficulties will arise 
on items not already put on the list of 
potentiahy restrainable items and the DC of 
importation will be unable to avoid responding 
to political pressures for trade restraint. 
An escape clause action for items not on this 
list would therefore be appropriate. At the 
same time, given the fact that this should not 
provide an incentive to escape from the option 
of putting such items on the restrainable list, it 
would be equally appropriate to make the 
invoking of this escape clause both more 
difficult and more costly. Thus, the escape 
clause should require that the importing DC be 
allowed nonetheless to invoke a trade restraint 
on items not on the list of potentially 
restrainable items, provided that (i) it makes a 
demonstrable case, under multilateral (GATT) 
auspices, of the existence of serious injury (as 
under the current GATT Article XIX) and (ii) it 
then makes a considerably larger penalty 
payment for the compensation of the exporting 
countries. It may also be noted further that one 
would, in practice, need a substantial time limit 
for an item to be on the restrainable list before 
permitting the invoking of trade restraints 
under it. Otherwise, as when this period could 
be a few weeks or months, it would pay 
countries to go this route rather than the 
proposed escape clause route where the 
proposed penalties are higher. 
(4) Automaticity of compensation 
The penalty/compensation would be auto- 
matic under the preceding rules, rather than 
constituting a mere possibility as in the current 
GATT Article XIX. This would rule out the use 
of political muscle to get out of this obligation 
when invoking trade restraints. 
(5) Financial form of compensation 
Moreover, the above rules require financial 
compensation. This is in contrast, for example, 
to the Article XIX variety of ‘compensation’, 
which takes the form of either grant of a new 
tariff concession (on something else) or of with- 
drawal of a tariff concession by the exporting 
country. This latter method reflects the tariff- 
bargaining framework in which GATT rules are 
enmeshed; it makes little sense since compen- 
sation to the exporter in the form of enabling 
the latter to raise a tariff in retaliation, for 
example, presupposes that the latter is 
advantageous while in fact, it is likely to cause 
yet more damage by further restraining trade; 
at the same time, it disrupts yet another market 
in seeking redress for the original market 
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disruption. The financial form of penalty/ 
compensation provided for in the rules 
suggested above is free from these obvious 
defects. 
(6) Compensation to exporting country 
Furthermore, the financial compensation is 
designed here for payment to the exporting 
country, rather than to the exporting industry: 
as called for by the theoretical analysis of 
Appendix II. In turn, the payment is to be 
made by the importing country. It may be 
noted that the latter financial penalty to be 
paid from the budget would, in turn, serve to 
generate executive counter-pressures against the 
industrial pressure groups for trade restraints, 
potential and actual. 
(7) Compensation only for LDCs 
The preceding rules in regard to compen- 
sation may be applied only to exporting LDCs. 
They are, after all, the countries which have 
been seriously affected by the textiles 
restrictions and by VERs, as we have already 
seen3’ Further, there is greater willingness, as 
part of the new international economic order, 
to grant LDCs reasonable accommodation via 
framing new rules regarding their trade. More- 
over, the flows of funds to be so generated are 
far more likely to be significant, relative to 
their needs, for LDCs than for DCs. Finally, 
discriminatory adjustment of trade rules, in 
favour of LDCs, is well-embedded in GATT 
reform, as in the enactment of Article XXIII 
for them at GATT. 
The foregoing set of rules, involving 
essentially compensation for exporting LDCs 
by importing DCs, are not entirely novel in 
their reference to the potential use of trade 
restraints since the well-established practice of 
the ‘binding’ of tariffs indeed implies that the 
potential use of restrictions is given up. In 
regard to the notion of the compensation itself, 
however, there are no obvious precedents. 
However, a precedent of sorts, which certainly 
suggests that what is being proposed here is 
fully feasible, relates to the payment by the 
United States of compensation to the Turkish 
government of a sizeable sum in order to 
enforce the ban on poppy production: by using 
this money to compensate Turkish farmers, in 
turn, this would theoretically have made it 
possible for them to shift to other cultivation at 
no financial 10~s.~’ This ‘precedent’ is spelled 
out in some detail in Appendix I. There would 
therefore appear to be nothing insuperable, 
politically, in putting the suggested compen- 
satory rules here onto the agenda for GATT 
reform. 
At the same time, it would be useful to note 
that, in complementarity to the rules suggested 
above, two DC policies would be extremely 
valuable, only one of which is being gradually 
extended in scope: 
(1) Insofar as the response to foreign 
imports, or to domestic decline due to other 
reasons, is to provide domestic adjustment 
assistance to assist factors of production to 
retrain and relocate, this will correspondingly 
reduce the need to resort to trade restraints by 
making the pressures for such restraints from 
the industry both less intense and politically 
less difficult to resist. In this regard, the easing 
of the criteria for such adjustment assistance in 
the recent US Trade Act of 1974 is welcome 
news for the exporting LDCS.~ * 
(2) Next, it is clear from elementary 
principles that trade restraint, to protect the 
production level of the domestic industry, is 
inferior to the use of a production subsidy: 
from the viewpoint of the importing DC 
itself.33 Equally, it is obvious that the use of 
the production subsidy will increase the overall 
market in the DC for the imported item while a 
tariff, by increasing the price for consumers, 
will reduce it. Hence, given the fact that 
domestic production must be maintained at a 
desired level, the use of a production subsidy 
by the importing DC will be preferable, from 
the viewpoint of the exporting LDC, than the 
use of a trade policy.34 Thus it would be useful 
if the overall reform in regard to the 
phenomenon of market-disruption-related trade 
restraints, as suggested in this section, were to 
include a multilateral agreement by DCs to use 
production subsidies rather than tariffs or trade 
quotas, whenever trade restraints are invoked 
under the rules specified above.35 The only 
exceptions to this code could include 
emergency situations where an immediate trade 
quota may be necessary: in this case, the quota 
could be phased out and replaced gradually by 
a production subsidy on a multilaterally agreed 
schedule. 
VI. PROPOSED MODIFICATION IN 
GATT ARTICLE XIX 
If the suggested rules in Section V are to be 
implemented, the logical place for them is the 
GATT; and there, the logical candidate for 
replacement by these rules is Article XIX. 
The GATT is being already re- 
examined - as, in fact, it has been continuously 
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since its inception in regard to new phenomena 
such as the growth of customs unions - in 
regard to the manifestation and growth of new 
problems such as the use of export quotas,s6 
for example, to hold back commodities for 
national objectives such as anti-inflationary 
policy. The recent thrust towards a new inter- 
national economic order also provides an ideal 
climate to re-examine long-standing issues such 
as market disruption which have beeh addressed 
but for which suitable solutions have not been 
provided. 
The rules suggested in Section V above 
therefore provide an agenda for replacing the 
basic content of Article XIX, in an inter- 
national economic climate where such a 
concrete proposal is likely to be examined 
without immediate hostility on the part of DCs. 
At the same time, in being concrete and 
specific, the suggested changes provide the 
necessary content and shape to the long- 
standing demands by LDCs that something be 
done about the phenomenon of market- 
disruption-related trade restraints from DCs. 
They constitute therefore an essential and 
useful input into the basic agenda for reforming 
GATT as part of a new international economic 
order. 
The formal adoption of such rules, replacing 
Article XIX, would also have to bring the 
existing VERs, including the 1974 Textiles 
Agreement, into line with them. This would be 
done most naturally by formally sanctioning 
them, but insisting on the payment of the 
penalty by the importing DCs to compensate 
the LDCs whose exports are being constrained 
by these restraints. Otherwise, there would be 
an advantage to invoking VERs prior to the 
reaching of agreement on the new rules.37 
Also, there would be an advantage in bringing 
all such trade restraints under one institutional 
umbrella, where they can be watched, 
monitored and regulated according to the 
suggested, new rules. 
The dynamics of reaching an agreement on 
these rules, finally, would presumably have to 
involve an initiative by the LDCs themselves, as 
they are the parties that are injured by the 
current and potential market-disruption-related 
trade restraints. The logical place for their 
initiative is therefore the UNCTAD, to be 
followed by action by the LDC members of the 
GATT at the GATT. The proposals advanced 
here certainly provide an alternative and 
consistent set of reform rules that need to be 
considered seriously alongside the suggestions 
concerning market disruption that have 
recently been aired by the LDCS.~ * 
NOTES 
1. Article XIX is one of several, so-called ‘safeguard’ 
provisions in GATT which enable the contracting 
parties to re-enact trade barriers for a number of 
specific reasons. Article VI, for example, allows the 
enacting of countervailing and antidumping duties. 
2. Cf. Stanley Metzger (1971, p. 168). 
3. It is thus well-known that the US executive has 
been generally more liberal on trade barriers reduction 
than the US Congress and the VERs were imposed 
often so as to prevent more serious protectionist 
legislation from becoming enacted in the Congress. 
4. Metzger, (1971, p. 173). 
5. This notion of market disruption as occurring 
whenever the domestic industry loses its relative share 
in the domestic market is implicit or explicit in trade 
legislation introduced earlier in the US House of 
Representatives. Thus HR 2511, introduced on 8 
January 1969, begins typically as follows: ‘A Bill to 
provide for the orderly marketing of flat glass 
imported into the United States by affording foreign 
supplying nations a fizir share of the growth or change 
in the United States flat glass market . . .’ (91st 
Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print, Committee 
on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, 
June 1970, US Government Printing Office. 
Washington, ‘1970, p. 172 [italics insertedj). Or takd 
HR 993 which begins with: ‘A Bill to provide for an 
equitable sharing of the United States market by 
electronic articles of domestic and of foreign 
origin . .’ (ibid., p. 150 [italics inserted] ). 
6. See Caroline Pestieau and Jacque Henry (1972, pp. 
139-140). The work referred to here is by Henry. 
7. Thus, according to Pestieau and Henry (1972), 
Canada had official VERs in 1971 with 20 countries, 
of which only 6 were DCs. 
8. Thus a Working Party at GATT had concluded 
that ‘developments occurring after the negotiation of 
the relevant tariff concession which it would not be 
reasonable to expect that the negotiations of the 
country making the concession could and should have 
foreseen at the time when the concession was 
negotiated’. Cf. GATT (1970-71, p. 107). 
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9. ibid. 
10. ibid. In fact, in the case of Germany, in regard to 
hard coal, the 1958 invoking of Clause XIX was in 
force as late as 1975. 
11. The Article builds in provision for consultations 
with interested contracting parties, which is the usual 
forum for granting the compensation if indeed 
granted. (Where the action is taken prior to consulta- 
tion, the interested contracting parties may retaliate. 
However, such retaliation has been quite rare, having 
occurred only in three cases to present date.) Further- 
more, as seen from Table 2, and corroborated also by 
unpublished tabulations at GATT, compensation is 
only a possibility, as noted in the text, and is often 
not provided when Article XIX is invoked. In fact, 
dissatisfaction with the compensation aspect of Article 
XIX has prompted occasional suggestions to do away 
with it and instead modify Article XIX so as to insist 
on the following of certain stricter criteria by the 
country invoking the Article. 
12. In some cases, the action took the form of 
establishing minimum valuations for imports, thus 
effectively raising the tariff rate for items with actual 
values below these minimums. 
13. GATT (1961b, p. 25). In fact, it was at the United 
States’ initiative that Article XIX had been included in 
GATT originally. 
14. Cf. GATT (1961a); also cited in Pestieau and 
Henry (1972, pp. 137-138), in Metzger (1971, pp. 
175-176), and discussed in GATT (1961b, pp. 25-26). 
15. Cf. Pest&u and Henry (1972, pp. 137-138). 
16. Metzger (1971, pp. 170-171). ‘As Henry states, the 
“entire story shows clearly that the US-Japan 
voluntary export restraint agreements of the 1930s 
resulted mainly from American pressures and threats 
of unilateral, permanent, and possibly more restrictive 
action”. “Nothing indicates”, he asserts, “that this 
pattern has changed since”. The Japanese, for their 
part, accepted the agreements as the most practicable 
means of preserving a portion of their textile exports 
to the United States, and in the interest of political 
harmony in this sphere of their relationships with the 
United States.’ 
17. Note that, ideally, one would rather examine how 
much trade is, in fact, inhibited at the margin by these 
VERs. 
18. Note, however, that this list would include also 
VERs imposed truly voluntarily by Japan, without 
duress from the importing countries, in the interest of 
‘price regulation’, quality control, etc. 
19. Cf. GATT (1974), Article 12, pp. 17-18. 
20. Cf. Metzger (1971, p. 170). 
21. Cf Metzger (1971, p. 182). 
22. It is interesting to note that the recent theory of 
nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas under 
uncertainty shows that if the uncertainty comes from 
foreign supply, the welfare-superiority of tariffs over 
quotas as methods of restricting imports to a given 
level is reversed if the tariff rate were high: precisely 
100% in the case of linear supply and demand 
schedules. Cf. the interesting work of Michael 
Pelcovits (1975). 
23, Pestieau and Henry (1972) note that the duration 
of a formal agreement is not identical with its 
incidence; occasionally, as with GATT Article XIX as 
well, the restriction will go into force before papers 
are exchanged. They also note that most Canadian 
VERs have duration of one year. 
24. Besides, export quotas have always been known to 
earn the monopoly rents (from restriction) for the 
exporters whereas domestic tariffs or quotas will earn 
them for the importer under competition. 
25. Pestieau and Henry (1972, p. 168): ‘Several 
Canadian laws include clauses that can be used to 
supplement or reinforce VERs, and the various 
amendments enacted in the context of the present 
government’s textile policy lessen the previous 
dependence on exporters’ voluntary collaboration. 
Prior to January 1969, subsection (7~) of section 40A 
of the Customs Act was used to apply special values 
for duty in instances where imports were found to 
have injured the interest of Canadian producers. 
However, this subsection was repealed and replaced on 
1 January 1969, by the new section 8 of the Customs 
Tariff Act. As stated in section 37 of the Anti- 
dumping Act (1969), the new section authorizes the 
imposition of a surtax on imports that cause or 
threaten to cause injury to Canadian producers of 
similar or directly competitive goods. The Export and 
Import Permits Act has also been amended to permit 
unilateral imposition of import-licensing quotas to 
deal with problems of disruptive imports whenever 
VER arrangements would not be feasible. Further- 
more, section S(c) of this Act enables the federal 
government o control imports and “to implement an 
intergovernmental arrangement or commitment” - 
clearly opening up a method of making 
VER arrangements more effective. 
These are the powers on which the efficiency of 
the Canadian VER system rests’. 
Examples can be found in US legislation as well, as 
in the Public Law 87488 (HR 10788) which amended 
Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 by the 
insertion of the following sentence: 
‘In addition, if a multilateral agreement has been or 
shall be concluded under the authority of this 
section among countries accounting for a 
significant part of world trade in the articles with 
respect to which the agreement was concluded, the 
President may also issue, in order to carry out such 
an agreement, regulations governing the entry or 
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withdrawal from warehouse of the same articles 
which are the products of countries not parties to 
the agreement.’ 
This legislation was approved on 19 June 1962. 
Note that both US and Canada have back-up 
legislation for VERs in cases of textiles and meat. 
26. Cf. GATT (1974, Annex B, p. 22). 
27. However, from a theoretical standpoint, it may be 
noted that VERs, as contrasted with import QRs, will 
transfer the monopoly rents from the trade restriction 
to the exporters, so that one may well consider this to 
constitute an implicit compensation under VER 
arrangement. In fact, as Bergsten has pointed out, 
textile quota tickets are actively sold throughout the 
Far East at a premium that reflects this rent. See Fred 
Bergsten (1975, pp. 239-271). 
28. An analogue to this recommendation may be 
found in the practice of ‘binding’ tariffs in advance. 
29. The loss inflicted by actual invoking of restraints 
is, of course well understood in the trade-theoretical 
literature. For measurement of the cost of sugar 
protectionism to exporting LDCs, for example, see the 
work of Snape and Johnson, reviewed in H. G. 
Johnson (1967). 
30. VERs have also affected Japan seriously; and, in 
some cases, such as the steel VERs in the USA, the 
impact was felt by the developed country exporters 
and imports were initially diverted to developing 
countries which thereby benefited. 
31. The compensation rules suggested for trade 
restraints in this paper, however, relate only to 
financial compensation to the exporting country, and 
nor to the exporting industry. For other contrasts, 
refer to Appendix I. 
32. For an excellent account of the US policies in 
regard to adjustment assistance, and evidence on the 
efforts to ease the criteria for it until 1973, see Robert 
Baldwin and John Mutti, ‘Policy issues in adjustment 
assistance: the United States’, in Helen Hughes (ed.) 
(1973), especially Section IV. Adjustment assistance 
in the EEC is also discussed in Chapter 7 of this 
volume. 
33. This is one of the important policy prescriptions 
from the theory of optimal policy intervention in the 
presence of ‘non-economic’ objectives and follows 
from the fact that the tariff imposes a consumption 
cost (by raising prices for consumers) which is 
avoided, while equally protecting domestic output, by 
a production subsidy. Cf. J. Bhagwati and T. N. 
Srinivasan (1969). 
34. This conclusion would have to be modified, but is 
not altogether nullified, if the domestic industry 
wishes to maintain a certain share of sales in the 
domestic market. The optimal policy intervention in 
this case, from the DC viewpoint, would be the 
combination of an import tariff and a production 
subsidy. 
35. A code of conduct, along these lines, is mentioned 
also by Henry, op. cit., p. 175, who states that this 
‘has been suggested in various places’ and cites one 
example from Bela Balassa (1967, pp. 160-161). 
36. See, in this regard, the excellent pamphlet by C. 
Fred Bergsten (1974). Bergsten does not consider 
VERs or market-disruption problems in this study. 
37. For long-standing restraints such as the Textiles 
Arrangement, it may be politically easier and also 
quite sensible to have the penalty enacted at the time 
of the next renewal, since there has been a short time 
limit on each such Arrangement. 
38. The latter have been neatly summarized in 
UNCTAD document TD/B/C.2/R.4. 
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APPENDIX I 
ON COMPENSATING FOR MARKET LOSS 
OF A BAN: THE TURKISH POPPY AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Outside of the GATT Article XIX frame- 
work (where compensation is non-automatic 
and furthermore applies only if the market 
disruption being nullified is a result of 
‘obligations incurred by a contracting party 
under this Agreement, including tariff con- 
cessions’, and whose applicability in any event 
has been emasculated by actions such as the 
LTA and VERs undertaken outside of its 
domain as noted in the text), the only major 
example of an importing country paying 
compensation to the exporting country when 
trade is sought to be eliminated or reduced is 
that of the United States paying Turkey a 
significant compensation to enforce the ban on 
Turkish poppy cultivation. 
This precedent is not perfect, while 
illustrating what is feasible. Its major difference 
from the compensation proposed for export 
market disruption is that its objective is to 
induce adjustment by compensating the 
exporting activity so that the exports will in 
consequence effectively cease, whereas the 
proposed compensation here is when exports 
have alreudy ceased (or been reduced) and the 
compensation is for the adjustment that has to 
occur with the decline in exports. This 
difference, of course, stems from the fact that 
the case deals with trade in a bad, rather than a 
good, and hence with illegal trade that was 
sought to be eliminated at source through 
banning the production activity itself. Its 
similarity, however, with the proposed 
compensation for export market disruption (for 
goods) consists in the fact that the importing 
country provided the compensation to the 
farmers in the exporting country for the adjust- 
ment necessary if the heroin trade was to be 
curtailed. Hence, a brief account and review of 
the salient features of the case of the Turkish 
poppy and the US adjustment assistance is 
relevant and follows in the rest of this 
Appendix. 
The US had been putting pressure on Turkey 
to reduce poppy cultivation for a long time. In 
response to this pressure, the number of 
provinces in which cultivation was legal was 
reduced from 42 (out of 70) in 1960 to 7 in 
1970, and 4 in 1971.’ On 30 June 1971, the 
US and Turkey announced a total ban on 
poppy cultivation. On 14 February 1974, 
Turkey unilaterally lifted the ban. 
The logistics of the poppy trade before the 
ban were as follows. By a simple process 
poppies can be turned to opium gum, which 
can in turn be manufactured into morphine 
base. Turkey produced around 120,000 kg of 
opium gum per yr. Legally, all of this was 
supposed to be sold to a state marketing 
agency, at $13 a kilo. But about half of the 
crop went on the black market, selling at 
around $35 a kilo. (Refined into morphine 
base - a cheap process - this became 
$550-$600 a kilo in Marseilles.)’ 
The agreement to ban cultivation called for 
US payments of $15 million a year, plus $20 
million for agricultural development 
Investments in the affected regions. This was to 
compensate the farmers, and also the Turkish 
government, for the $3.5 million a year it 
earned from morphine export. The Turkish 
marketing organization was to pay farmers a 
compensation of $40 per kilo for poppies not 
grown.3 
For more than a year after the ban, there 
was little impact on the flow of heroin, as 
dealers drew down their stockpiles.4 But 
eventually the ban had a major effect, doubling 
heroin prices in the US. 
The ban was unpopular with farmers, and 
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politicians in a seven-province area agitated for sovereignty eventually appear to have played 
an end.6 In the October 1973 elections all some role also in the termination of the ban.’ 
political parties promised to review the ban.’ 
When cultivation was resumed, the Turkish 
government said that it was because of hard- NOTES - . 
slups to the peasants, that it was unfair to ask 
Turkey to bear this burden. 1. New York Times (21 February 1974). 
It would appear that the Turkish farmers 
were compensated only at the legal prices 
2. New York Times (9 August 1973). 
presumabl; available on their poppy, sd that 
the premium from illegal sales for heroin was 
3. New York Times (9 August 1973). 
lost by them under the ban, despite the 4. New York Times (10 October 1972). 
compensation; and hence the discontent. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that the ban was 5. New York Times (21 February 1974). 
somewhat sudden and hence little of the 
developmental aid was actually spent in the 6. New York Times (9 August 1973). 
poppy-growing region by the time the 
discontent surfaced.s Finally, the ban having 
7. New York Times (21 February 1974). 
been forced initially on a reluctant Turkey by 8. New York Times (21 February 1974). 
the United States, which was naturally frantic 
to stem the heroin traffic, questions of Turkish 9. Wall Street Journal (23 June 1974). 
APPENDIX II 
. 
OPTIMAL TRADE POLICY AND COMPEN- 
SATION UNDER ENDOGENOUS UNCER- 
TAINTY: THE PHENOMENON OF MARKET 
DISRUPTION 
Introduction 
The fact that ‘market disruption’ permits or 
prompts importing countries to invoke 
quantitative import restrictions (or, what is 
more fashionable in recent times, voluntary 
export restrictions by the exporting countries, 
at the urging of the importing countries) 
immediately implies that the exporting country 
faces a situation of endogenous uncertainty: 
where its own export level can affect the 
probability of such quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) being imposed. It simultaneously raises 
the following analytical questions which have 
obvious policy implications: 
(1) What is the optimal trade policy for an 
exporting country which is faced by such QR- 
intervention? 
(2) Since the possibility of such 
QR-intervention must restrict the trade 
opportunity set relative to that which would 
obtain in the absence of the QR-possibility, can 
one meaningfully define the loss that such a 
QR-possibility imposes on the exporting 
country and therefore the compensation that 
could be required to be paid to the exporting 
country under, say, a modified set of GATT 
rules? 
I. Optimal trade policy: two-period model with 
zero adjustment costs 
To analyze the problem of optimal trade 
policy for the exporting country in the 
presence of market-disruption-induced 
possibility of QR-intervention, we will deploy 
the usual trade-theoretic model of general 
equilibrium, but will extend it to a two-period 
framework in Section I-IV. In Section III, we 
will also introduce adjustment costs, beginning 
with a simple formulation which has putty in 
period 1 and clay in period 2.’ 
Thus, consider a 2-commodity model of 
international trade. We then assume a 2-period 
time horizon such that the level of exports E in 
the first period affects the probability P(E) of a 
quota ?? being imposed at the beginning of the 
next period.2 
Let CJIC1, C2 ] be the standard social utility 
function defined in terms of the consumption 
Ci of commodity i (i = 1,2). By assumption, it 
is known at the beginning of the next period 
whether the quota E has been imposed or not. 
Thus, the policy in the next period will be to 
maximize U subject to the transformation 
function F[X, ,X2] = 0 and the terms of trade 
function n if no quota is imposed and with an 
additional constraint E < ?? if the quota is 
imposed. 
Let now the maximal welfare with and with- 
out the quota be u and grespectively. Clearly 
then, we have d> y when the quota is binding. 
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The expected welfare in the second period is 
then clearly: 
_vP(E)+D[l -P(E)]. 
The objective function for the first period 
therefore is: 
@= U[X, - E,X, +rrE] 
+pWP(E)+8{ 1 -P(E))], 
where p is the discount factor. This is then to 
be maximized subject to the domestic trans- 
formation constraint, F[Xi ,Xz I = 0. In doing 
this, assume that P(E) is convex function of E, 
i.e. the probability of a quota being imposed 
increases, at an increasing rate as E is increased, 
and that, in the case where n depends on E, nE 
is concave in E. Then, the first-order conditions 








=-l71 +u2{il+m’5 - 
p(U - y) P’(E) = 0. (3) 
Now, Equations (1) and (2) yield the 
familiar result that the marginal rate of sub- 
stitution in consumption equals the marginal 
rate of transformation. Equation (3) moreover 
can be written as: 
u1 - = (n + n’E) - /’ {-I P’(E). 
u2 
(3’) 
If (A) monopoly power is absent (n’ = 0) and if 
(B) the first period’s exports do not affect the 
probability of a quota being imposed in the 
second period, then (3’) clearly reduces to the 
standard condition that the marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption equals the (average 
= marginal) terms of trade. If (A) does not hold 
but (B) holds, then *equals the marginal 
terms of trade (n + rr’E), leading to the familar 
optimum tariff. If both A and B are present, 
there is an additional tariff element: 
‘IOU; ‘1 P’(E). 
This term can be explained as follows: if 
an additional unit of exports takes place in 
period 1, the probability of a quota being 
imposed and hence a discounted loss in welfare 
of p(u - a occurring, increases by P’(E). 
Thus, at the margin, the expected loss in 
welfare is p( &’ -u)P’(E) since there is no loss in 
welfare if the quota is not imposed. Converted 
to numeraire terms, this equals 
P(U - YV”W) .? 
and must be subtracted from the marginal 
terms of trade (n + n’E), the effect of an 
additional unit of exports on the quantum of 
imports3 
It is then clear that the market-disruption- 
induced QR-possibility requires optimal inter- 
vention in the form of a tariff (in period 1). It 
is also clear that, compared to the optimal 
situation without such a QR-possibility, the 
resource allocation in the QR-possibility case 
will shift against exportable production: i.e. 
comparative advantage, in the welfare sense, 
shifts away, at the margin, from exportable 
production. Moreover, denoting the utility level 
under the optimal polic . 
quota possibility as $J$~<, . %et?rerrr?~nla~~ 
faire with the quota possibrhty as ti , and that 
under laissez faire without this quot P possibility 
as@%@ we can argue that 
This result is set out, with the attendant period- 
wise utility levels achieved under each option, 
in Table 1 which is self-explanatory.4 
For the case of a small country, with no 
monopoly power in trade (except for the quota 
possibility), the equilibria under alternative 
policies are illustrated in Figure 1.’ Thus, r 
represents the utility level in the absence of a 







x2 : Importabl* 
Figure 1. 
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Optimal policy Laissez faire 
intervention with Luissez faire with with no quota 
possible quota possible quota possibility 
ir ii u 
p [UP + U(l-P*)] PI@+ U(l-P)l PU 
@OPT 
4JL k 
Q Q NQ 
@opT>f$L;@L >r#lL 
Q Q NQ Q 
Notation: (1) u is utility level if quota is imposed. 
(2) ris utility level if quota is not imposed. 
(3) U* is utility level with optimal policy intervention when 
quota can be imposed in second period. 
(4)&F) is the probability of second-period quota of & being 
imposed, as a function of the first-period exports, E. With 
optimal policy intervention in the situation with possible 
quota, the exports of the first period result in a value of P* 
for P(E). With laissez faire, the exports in the first period 
will be different and the corresponding value for P(E) is p. 
(5) p is the discount factor. 
(6)& > @gm necessarily only for small countries with no 
influence on terms of trade. 
(7) @OPT NP , when the country is optimally exercising its monopoly 
power in trade and there is no QR possibility, is not listed 
above. 
imposed, and U* the first-period utility level 
reached under the optimal policy intervention 
option. Note that equilibrium with CJ* 
naturally requires that the export level is being 
restricted below the level that would be reached 
with non-intervention (at m, while exceeding 
the level reached in equilibrium when the quota 
is invoked (at a. Also, note that the optimal 
policy for restricting the first-period level of 
exports is a tariff: a conclusion that is, of 
course, familiar from the theory of optimal 
intervention under non-economic objectives as 
considered in Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan (1969). 
II. Defining the loss from market-disruption- 
induced QR-possibility 
Consider now the measure of the loss to the 
exporting country from this possibility of a 
market-disruption-induced QR. One can think 
of alternative ways in which this loss could be 
defined: 
Measure I: Taking expected utilities, one can 
define the loss of welfare to the exporting 
country as the difference between @kQ and eo: 
i.e. the loss in expected welfare that follows, in 
the absence of optimal intervention by the 
exporting country, from the QR-possibility. 
This measure clearly is: pP (u - y) and is, 
of course, nothing but the expected loss in 
period-2 from the possible imposition of the 
quota, duly discounted. 
Now, it is also clear that this measure will lie 
between the ex-post period-2 loss if the quota is 
invoked (which loss, duly discounted, is 
p(u - y)) and the ex-post period-2 loss if the 
quota is not invoked (which loss is, of course, 
zero). Thus, one must regard the actual 
period-2 loss when the quota is invoked as an 
upper bound on the loss in this model. 
It also follows that there is a welfare loss, 
measured as pp(r - IL) even if the quota is Clearly then, the expected welfare 4 is now 
not actually invoked in period 2 and, (in our as follows: 
2-period model), the actual equilibrium 
allocations in each period are identical between @=Ur[Xr -Er,Xz +rrEl] 
the QR-possibility and the no-QR-possibility 
situations. This follows clearly from the fact + @(El )_u2 [X, - E, X2 + 1rE1 
that, in period 1, consumers face the prospect + p{ 1 -P(EI)}3[x,-E,, X,+7&1. 
of uncertain prices in period 2, as the QR may 
or may not be invoked. This is then maximized subject to the implicit 
Measure II: Alternatively one may measure transformation function, F(Xi $a) = 0, as 
the loss to the exportin 
difference between @$ countryopaTS % 
before. The first-order conditions for an 
and #e , interior maximum then are: 
difference between expected welfare when 
there is no QR-possibility but the optimal tariff 
to exploit monopoly power is being exercised 
$$ 
1 
= U; +pP(E1)Q: 
and that when the government of the exporting +p{1 -P(E&i7: -VI =o; (4) 
country intervenes with optimal policy to 
maximize expected welfare when there is a = CJ; + pP(E1 )E$ 
QR-possibility. This alternative measure would 
% 2 
be more meaningful ior exporting countries +p{1 -P(&)}U$ -xF2 =o; (5) 
with governmental tmde agencies or exporters’ 
associations with ability to regulate their overall * = -41 + {n(E,) + E$(El)}U;; 
export levels, whereas Measure I would be more 
aEl 1 






III. Adjusting for adjustment costs: a putty- P + {s(Ez)+Ezn’(Ez)}~ 
clay model 1 {l-P(EI)} 
So far, our analysis was based on the = 0; (7) 
assumption that the choice of optimal 
production in period 2 was not constrained by dU[& -El, X2+7@ I 
the choice of production in period 1. Thus, in 
Figure 1, the economy could move from Pi or 
where ujr = Mj 
Pz in period 1 to Pa in period 2, along the 
(long-run) transformation curve AB. However, 




possible adjustment costs: i.e., we were 
essentially dealing with a putty model. 2 _ aiqx, 4, x2+d3 
However, this procedure eliminates an Uj - and 
important aspect of the problem raised by 
aXj 
market disruption. So, in this section, we x = the Lagrangean multiplier associated with 
modify our model and analysis to allow for the constraint, 
adjustment costs. However, to simplify the 
analysis, we take initially the extreme polar F(Xr ,X2) = 0. 
case of a putty-clay model, where the 
production choice made in period 1 cannot be The interpretation of these first-order 
modified in any way in period 2. conditions is straightforward. Condition (7) 
With this modification, the choice variables states that, given the optimal production levels, 
now are: Xi, the production of commodity i in the level of exports in period 2 when no quota 
periods 1 and 2 (i = 1,2); El, the net exports of is imposed must be such as to equate the 
commodity 1 in period 1; and Ez, the net marginal rate of substitution in consumption to 
exports of commodity 1 in period 2 when no the marginal terms of trade. Condition (6) is 
quota is imposed. As before, .??is the net export identical in form to the one obtained earlier: 
of commodity 1 when the quota is imposed. the optimal exports in period 1 must not 
Superscripts refer to periods 1 and 2. equate the marginal rate of substitution in con- 
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sumption in that period to the marginal terms 
of trade, but must instead also allow for the 
marginal change in expected welfare arising out 
of the change in probability of a quota being 
imposed: the latter equals P’(El) (u2 - Y2) 
where u2 = U[X, -Ez, X2 + nEz I and 
Y2 = UIXI -E, X2 + nE]. Thus, condition (6) 
ensures the optimal choice of exports in period 
1, given the production levels. Conditions (4) 
and (5) then relate to the optimal choice of 
production levels and, as we would expect, the 
introduction of adjustment costs does make a 
difference. Writing (4) and (5) in the familiar 
ratio form, we get: 
t;l= q +P%wL!~ +P{l-P(&))Cr: 
F2 u: +pP(&)Z +P{I-P(EI)}q. 
(8) 
Clearly therefore the marginal rate of trans- 
formation in production (in periods 1 and 2, 
identically, as production in period 1 will carry 
over into period 2 by assumption), i.e. F1 lF2, 
must not equal the marginal rate of substitution 
in consumption in period 1, i.e. U; /Vi, (unlike 
our earlier analysis without adjustment costs in 
Sections I and II). Rather, FI/F2 should equal 
a term which properly takes into account the 
fact that production choices once made in 
period 1 cannot be changed in period 2 to suit 
the state (i.e. the imposition or absence of a 
quota) obtaining in period 2. Equation (8) can 
be readily interpreted as follows. 
The LHS is, of course, the marginal rate of 
transformation in production. The RHS 
represents the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption, if re-interpreted in the following 
sense. Suppose that the output of commodity 
1, the exportable, is increased by one unit in 
period 1 (and hence in period 2 as well, by 
assumption). Given an optimal trade policy, 
then, the impact of this on welfare can be 
examined by adding it to consumption in each 
period. Thus social utility is increased in period 
1 by Vi while in period 2 it will increase by e 
if no quota is imposed and by _CJ if the quota is 
imposed. Thus, the discounted increase in 
period 2 welfare is given as: 
Thus, the total expected welfare impact of a 
unit increase in the production of commodity 1 
is: 
Similarly, a decrease in the production of 
commodity 2 by a unit in period 1 (and hence 
in period 2 as well) reduces expected welfare 
by: 
Hence, the ratio of these two expressions, just 
derived, represents the ‘true’ marginal rate of 
substitution, and this indeed is the RHS in 
Equation (8) to which the marginal rate of 
transformation in production - F, /F2 , the 
LHS in Equation (8) - is to be equated for 
optimality. 
The optimal policy interventions in this 
modified model with adjustment costs are 
immediately evident from Equations (6) - (8) 
and the preceding analysis. Thus, in period 1, 
the ratio U: /Uk is clearly the relative price of 
commodity 1 (in terms of commodity 2) facing 
consumers, while or is the average terms of 
trade. Thus CJ: /CJi differs from n(El) by 
[n’El _ PP’(E, 1 { sfi - 3P 1 ] 
u: 
and this difference constitutes a consumption 
tax on the importable, commodity 2. An 
identical difference between F, IF,, the relative 
price facing producers, and n(El) would define 
a production tax on commodity 2 at the same 
rate, so that a tariff at this rate would 
constitute the appropriate intervention in the 
model with no adjustment costs. However, with 
adjustment costs, Equation (8) defines, for 
period 1, the appropriate production tax-cum- 
subsidy which, in general, will diverge from the 
appropriate consumption tax: so that the 
optimal mix of policies in the model with 
adjustment costs will involve a tariff (reflecting 
both the monopoly power in trade and the QR 
possibility) plus a production tax-cum-subsidy 
in period 1 .6 In period 2, in both the models 
(with and without adjustment costs), an 
appropriate intervention in the form of a tariff 
(to exploit monopoly power) would be called 
for; however, with production fixed at period 1 
levels in the adjustment-cost model, a 
consumption tax-cum-subsidy would equally 
suffice. Specifically, note that in period 2, with 
adjustment costs, the price ratio facing 
consumers would be q/o: if no quota is 
imposed, with the average terms of trade at 
7r(E2 ) and the producers’ price ratio (as defined 
along the putty-transformation frontier) would 
be F, /F2 ; on the other hand, if the quota is 
imposed, these values change to Y: /z, n(E) 
and F, IF2 respectively. The consumption tax- 
cum-subsidy and the equivalent tariff (with no 
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impact on production decision, already frozen 
at period 1 levels), are then defined by these 
divergences, depending on whether the quota 
obtains or not. 
A tabular comparison of the characteristics 
of the optimal solution, with and without 
adjustment costs, is presented in Table 2 and 
should assist the reader. 
Note that the above results are quite 
consistent with the basic propositions of the 
theory of distortions, as developed in Bhagwati- 
Ramaswami (1963), Johnson (1965) and 
Bhagwati (197 1): the first-best, optimal policy 
intervention for the case with adjustment costs 
requires a trade policy to adjust for the foreign 
distortion (represented by the effect of current 
exports on the period 2 probability of a quota 
being invoked) and a production taxcum- 
subsidy to adjust for the existence of 
adjustment costs in production. It also follows, 
from the equivalence propositions, that the 
combination of the optimal tariff and the 
optimal production tax-cum-subsidy can be 
reproduced identically by a tariff set at the 
‘net’ production tax-cum-subsidy required by 
the optimal solution plus a consumption 
tax-cumsubsidy. Similarly, while our analysis 
has been focused on first-best policy inter- 
vention, the fundamental results of the theory 
of distortions and welfare on second-best 
policies also can be immediately applied to our 
problem. Thus, if there are zero adjustment 
costs so that there is only the foreign distortion 
in period 1, then clearly a production tax-cum- 
subsidy will improve (but not maximize) 
welfare. Similarly, if there are adjustment costs 
as well, then there will be two distortions and 
then we would now have applicable here the 
Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan (1969) pro- 
position that no feasible, welfare-improving 
form of intervention may exist if both of the 
policy measures that wiJl secure optimal inter- 
vention cannot be used simultaneously. 
Table A2. Characteristics of optimal solutidns in models 
with and without adjustment costsa 
No adjustment costs Adjustment costs 
Period 1 
DRSl # FRTt DRSl # FRTl 
DRSl = DRTl DRSl # DRTl 
Period 2 
DRS2 = DRT2 
= FRT2 
DRS2 = FRT2 
(DRT2 not relevant as 
production is frozen 
at period 1 levels) 
Notes: a. DRS, DRT and FRT represent he marginal rates of 
substitution in consumption, domestic transformation, and 
foreign transformation respectively. For an earlier use of 
these abbreviations ee Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan 
(1969). Since we are considering an interior maximum, the 
inequalities do not include corner equilibria, of course. The 
subscripts refer to the periods, 1 and 2. 
NOTES 
1. The full-length JIE paper also extends the analysis as to allow for varying levels of quota is noted later in 
to lesser rigidity and to steady state analysis. this section. 
2. This method of introducing market disruption 
presupposes that the QR-level is prespecified but that 
the probability of its being imposed will be a function 
of how deeply the market is penetrated in the 
importing country and therefore how effective the 
import-competing industry’s pressure for protection 
will be vis-his the importing country’s government. 
The effect of modifying this simplifying assumption so 
3. Instead of assuming that the fixed quota of E will 
be imposed with robability P(E), one could assume 
that a quota of %wiB be imposed with probability 
density P(r&). In other words, the quota level Fis 
variable and the probability of imposition depends 
both on the level ??and on the quantum of exports E 
in the first period. Let f(n denote the maximum of 
WC, ,C, 1 subject to F(X, ,X,) = 0 and E < E where 
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C, = (X, - E, ) and C, = (X, + nE, ). Then the 
expected welfare in period 2, given the export level E 
in the first period, is ~foP@‘$‘)d~ Let us denote this 
by h(E). Thus the maximand o now becomes 
U[X, - E, X, f HE] + ph(E) 
and condition (3’) becomes 
lJ ph’@‘) $, = n+ n’E + U, 
Now h’(E) is the change in expected welfare in period 
2 due to an additional unit of export in period 1 and 
this has to be added to the marginal terms of trade 
II + n’E. Nothing substantive therefore changes. Note 
however that if we allow for many exporting countries 
and if the share in the overall quota level granted in 
period 2 to one exporting country will increase with 
the export level achieved by that country in period 1, 
this would produce an incentive to increase, rather 
than decrease, the export level in period 1, ceteris 
paribus. Hence our analysis based on one exporting 
country would need to be modified correspondingly. 
4. However, we cannot assert that okQ > or 
except in the case of a small country with no influence 
on the terms of trade; this follows from the fact that 
@hQ is no longer the first-best policy in the presence 
of monopoly power in trade, so that U* may well 
exceed uin Table 1. 
5. Needless to say, for a country with no monopoly 
power, it is not meaningful to think of market 
disruption leading to QRs: if the country is indeed 
atomistic in foreign markets, its exports surely will not 
cause market disruption. Our analysis, of course, 
allows for monopoly power; only Figure 1 illustrates 
the simple case of a small country. 
6. It should be pointed out that atomistic fnrns in 
period 1 are assumed to respond to that period’s prices 
only. This assumption can be justified on the ground 
that they are likely to assume that these prices will 
carry over into the next period, since there is no other 
obvious mechanism by which they can anticipate the 
‘true’ period 2 prices. 
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